In loving memory of Asher Peres, we discuss a most important and influential paper written in 1935 by his thesis supervisor and mentor Nathan Rosen, together with Albert Einstein and Boris Podolsky. In that paper, the trio known as EPR questioned the completeness of quantum mechanics. The authors argued that the then-new theory should not be considered final because they believed it incapable of describing physical reality. The epic battle between Einstein and Bohr intensified following the latter's response later the same year. Three decades elapsed before John S. Bell gave a devastating proof that the EPR argument was fatally flawed. The modest purpose of our paper is to give a critical analysis of the original EPR paper and point out its logical shortcomings in a way that could have been done 70 years ago, with no need to wait for Bell's theorem. We also present an overview of Bohr's response in the interest of showing how it failed to address the gist of the EPR argument.
Introduction
In 1935, Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen published a paper that sent shock waves in the physics community [5] , especially in Copenhagen. Léon Rosenfeld wrote about the impact this paper had on Niels Bohr, one of the fathers of quantum mechanics and its hardiest defender at the time, that "this onslaught came down to us as a bolt from the blue" [11] . Quantum mechanics (QM) was still a relatively young theory, which had arisen from several experimental facts. It exhibited so many weird features that Bohr once said: "Anyone who is not shocked by quantum theory has not understood it"
1 . Among the non-classical effects of QM, we note its fundamentally probabilistic nature and the fact that we cannot determine simultaneously the position and momentum of a particle with arbitrary precision. In fact, forget about measuring them: QM tells us that these two conjugate variables cannot have simultaneous existence. These exotic features did not appeal to everyone in the physics community. To some, they were an indication that QM was incapable of fully describing physical reality. So, with this thought in mind, Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) published the celebrated paper entitled "Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?" [5] , in which they put forth an argumentation purportedly answering their own question in the negative. Seventy years after its publication, this is still the most heavily downloaded paper from the American Physical Society website www.aps.org ! Even though there is evidence [7, 8] that Einstein had been thinking about it as early as 1931, the notion of entanglement was first published in the 1935 EPR paper. The authors used the correlations obtained from bipartite measurements of an entangled state to claim that it is possible for the position and momentum of a particle to have simultaneous existence. Since the formalism of QM precludes such a possibility, they concluded that QM cannot offer a complete description of physical reality. Even though the term "local hidden variable" (LHV) was yet to be coined, it follows in their opinion that nature has to feature LHVs that cannot be known collectively through any experiment-for otherwise the Heisenberg uncertainty relations would be violated-but nevertheless these variables determine the behaviour of the physical system under measurement. Einstein then spent much of the rest of his life in the vain search of such a theory.
Almost thirty years elapsed before a paper by John S. Bell doomed EPR's quest for a LHV theory of nature [2] . More specifically, Bell defined the most general LHV model possible and showed that no such model can yield the correlations predicted by QM when the entangled system proposed by EPR-or more precisely its variation subsequently proposed by David Bohm [3] -is measured, proving in effect that the EPR argument could not show that QM is incomplete. Nevertheless, the situation could have been worse for quantum mechanics: it could have been outright incorrect! Subsequent experiments [6, 1] established the supremacy of QM over LHV theories, a somewhat ironic backfiring of the intent of the EPR paper. It is a great pity that Einstein did not live to see these breakthroughs.
Even though it took the better part of three decades before Bell was able to reject all possible LHV models, EPR's conclusions were debated right away. Two months after the publication of the EPR paper, Bohr submitted a response to the same journal, with the exact same title [4] . Quite obviously, Einstein was left entirely unconvinced by Bohr's response. More on this in Section 5.
We wish to present here, in loving memory of Asher Peres, a hopefully insightful discussion of the EPR argument. The originality of our approach, from a contemporary perspective, is that its purpose is to poke holes in the the EPR paper without any reference to Bell's inequality. Consequently, its subtitle could have been: "Why we would have questioned EPR independently of Bohr's response, even before Bell came along"! The holes we poke are nowhere as fatal as Bell's and they do not rule out the possibility of a LHV theory, which was therefore still a legitimate field of research until the fateful year 1964. Instead, we show that the EPR exposition of their ideas needed polishing for it is marred by several logical errors.
After this Introduction, we summarize in Section 2 the EPR argument by quoting the most relevant excerpts from their paper. Section 3 is the main contribution of our paper: we rephrase those quotes in the language of mathematical logic, which allows us to analyse precisely the meaning of the words used by EPR, and exhibit logical holes in them. We address the issue of spukhafte Fernwirkungen in Section 4. In Section 5, we present an overview of Bohr's response to the EPR paper in the interest of showing how it failed to address the gist of the EPR argument. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument
As for what should be considered a valid theory of nature, EPR proposed the following two criteria: (1) the theory should be correct and (2) the theory should be complete. Of course, the scientific paradigm should also demand falsifiability as a criterion of validity, but the EPR argument hinges upon the completeness (or purported lack of completeness) of QM. Specifically, the authors give the following definition. The definition of a physical reality given by EPR, which they "regard as reasonable" with no further apparent need for justification, is spelt out in a very famous quote from their paper.
Definition 2 (Physical reality).
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.
As we shall see, the EPR argument is centred around two statements.
Statement A. Quantum mechanical description of reality is not complete.

Statement B. Non-commuting operators cannot have simultaneous reality.
They use both of these statements in an intricate manner in order to come up with the final "conclusion" that Statement A must be true. The structure of their proof can be established from the following two quotes, which appear at the end of the first section of their paper.
(a) either (1) the quantum-mechanical description of reality given by the wave function is not complete or (2) when operators corresponding to two physical quantities do not commute the two quantities cannot have simultaneous reality.
(b) In quantum mechanics it is usually assumed that the wave function does contain a complete description of the physical reality of the system in the state to which it corresponds. [. . . ] We shall show, however, that this assumption, together with the criterion of reality given above, leads to a contradiction.
The argument culminates in their conclusion:
(c) Starting then with the assumption that the wave function does give a complete description of the physical reality, we arrived at the conclusion that two physical quantities, with noncommuting operators, can have simultaneous reality. [. . . ] We are thus forced to conclude that the quantummechanical description of physical reality given by wave functions is not complete.
The Language of Logic
To extract the substance of the EPR argument, we shall now rephrase its structure in the language of mathematical logic. In this language, Quote (a) translates to: "Either Statement A or Statement B". The normal usage of "either p or q" in English corresponds mathematically to the exclusive-or of p and q, namely that either p or q is true but not both. This is written p ⊕ q in modern mathematical notation. Therefore, EPR's first quote amounts to saying that A ⊕ B .
Quote (b) is a little more subtle to translate into the language of mathematical logic. First of all, we must understand that "the criterion of reality given above", at the end of the quote, corresponds to Statement B being true. Therefore, Quote (b) translates to ¬A ∧ B ⇒ false. This is mathematically equivalent to saying that ¬A ⇒ ¬B
as can be verified easily using a truth table. Proposition (2) is stated more explicitly in the first sentence of Quote (c) above.
Given that EPR eventually derive their desired conclusion, namely Statement A, after "establishing" the truth of both quotes, their final argumentQuote (c)-hinges upon logical tautology (1) ∧ (2) ⇒ A:
Having set the stage for our logical analysis of the EPR argument, we now proceed to discussing these three propositions one by one.
The First Proposition
In order to establish A ⊕ B, it must be shown that either Statement A or Statement B holds. To do this, EPR used the fact that the formalism of QM does not allow for a particle's position and momentum to be simultaneously defined. Therefore, if position and momentum do indeed have simultaneous reality (negation of Statement B) then QM cannot be complete (Statement A). In other words, ¬B ⇒ A. Furthermore, they also argued that if QM is already a complete theory (negation of Statement A) then it must be the case that position and momentum cannot have simultaneous reality (Statement B). In other words, ¬A ⇒ B.
At this point, we remark that working through both implications was redundant since they are logically equivalent, each one being the contrapositive of the other. A more serious problem with the EPR argumentation is that the desired conclusion (1) does not follow! Indeed, ¬A ⇒ B is logically equivalent to A ∨ B, which cannot be used to conclude that A ⊕ B. Worse: no amount of logical reasoning can save the day since nowhere do EPR argue that it's not possible for both Statements A and B to hold, and indeed that would be possible should QM be incomplete for some other reason! We suspect that this problem with the EPR argument simply comes from our (linguistically correct) interpretation of the word "either" in Quote (a) from Section 2: Instead of Proposition (1), no doubt EPR had
in mind, which indeed is correct, even by today's account. This happened either because EPR were not careful in their use of the English language, or because the meaning of "either" has evolved in the past seventy years. But there is no reason to worry further about this issue since we shall see in Section 3.3 that it has no real impact on the EPR conclusion.
The Second Proposition
In order to "prove" ¬A ⇒ ¬B, Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen used a bipartite entangled state of two particles, where two physicists, say Alice and Bob, take one particle each and move to space-like separated regions. Let us assume that Alice performs a momentum measurement on her particle. From the measurement postulate of QM, she is then able to predict with certainty the outcome of a momentum measurement on Bob's particle. Since Alice and Bob are in space-like separated regions, there cannot be any further interaction between the particles once they are separated. Therefore, Alice's measurement cannot have disturbed Bob's system in any way. Hence, according to Definition 2, momentum corresponds to an element of physical reality for Bob's particle. Let us change the assumption to a position measurement on Alice's part of the entangled state, instead of a momentum measurement. Once again, she will be able to predict the result of a position measurement on Bob's particle without having disturbed it. Therefore, position also corresponds to an element of physical reality for Bob's particle. It "follows" that position and momentum (two non-commuting operators) had to have simultaneous reality before either measurement. This "establishes" that B is false.
The flaw, of course, is that EPR's argument hinged upon counterfactual arguments of the kind "the physicist could do this or he could do that" in cases when clearly he could not do both. Nobody put this flaw in better light than Asher Peres, in his famous aphorism: "Unperformed experiments have no results" [10] . Since Alice cannot perform both measurements, it is not the case that both outcomes are defined simultaneously. Being fully aware that Einstein would have been left utterly unconvinced by this reasoning, we take here a different line of attack, based on logic rather than physics.
Recall that we were supposed to prove ¬A ⇒ ¬B. The careful reader will have noticed that EPR reached their desired "¬B" conclusion without having at any point invoked the assumption "¬A"! Indeed, the reasoning did not hinge upon the completeness of QM or lack thereof. Instead, it hinged upon the correctness of QM, in particular the correctness of the measurement postulate. Therefore, if we are willing to assume that QM is correct in terms of its predictions about what can be observed-which we believed to have been EPR's point of view-then the EPR argument that purports to prove ¬A ⇒ ¬B in fact directly "proves" ¬B.
The Tautology
From a purely logical point of view, there is nothing to complain about here. . . at least on first approach. Proposition (3) is indeed a tautology, as is easily seen by use of a truth table or a rather simple logical argument 3 . However, this tautology is not genuinely relevant to the EPR argument. First of all, as discussed in Section 3.1, Proposition (1) should be replaced by Proposition (4) in the tautology (3), yielding
The good news is that Proposition (5) is also a tautology, whence the issue of the precise meaning of "either. . . or" turns out to be moot, as promised at the end of Section 3.1.
But now remember that, notwithstanding Quote (b), the reasoning given by EPR does not prove Proposition (2) since they used nowhere the assumption "¬A" that QM is complete. Rather, they "proved" ¬B directly, under the sole assumption that QM is correct-in particular the measurement postulate-which seems to be taken for granted throughout the paper so strongly that it's not worth calling it an "assumption". Therefore, the somewhat complicated-looking tautology that we wrote down as Proposition (3), to translate the English written words of EPR, boils down in the end to nothing more than:
This statement is such a triviality 4 that we are forced to conclude that the original tautology was a smoke-screen at best.
In summary, the EPR conclusion may have been correct had they been allowed to make counterfactual reasoning, but their logic to get there was unnecessarily intricate and even outright wrong in some places.
3 Assume A to be false. Then B is true since A ⊕ B. But then A would be true since ¬A ⇒ ¬B is equivalent to B ⇒ A and B is true. This contradicts the assumption that A is false, and it must therefore be the case that A is true. 4 If A or B is true and it is not B, then it must be A. Please compare this with the reasoning spelt out in the previous footnote!
Spukhafte Fernwirkungen
Consider the following quote from the EPR paper, which corresponds to the situation after an interaction has left two particles in the singlet state.
We can then calculate with the help of Schrödinger's equation the state of the combined system [. . . ]. We cannot, however, calculate the state in which either one of the two systems is left after the interaction. This, according to quantum mechanics, can be done only with the help of further measurements, by a process know as the reduction of the wave packet.
From a modern perspective, this is utter nonsense! Of course we can calculate the state of either system by use of partial tracing: it's the completely mixed state. Obviously, EPR considered that only pure states deserve being called "states". Given their insistence on "elements of reality", this position is hardly surprising. Nevertheless, we must point out that von Neumann had already introduced density matrices [9] a few years before EPR wrote their paper.
If we take the epistemic viewpoint according to which the density matrix corresponding to Bob's possible knowledge is all there is to the state of his particle, then Alice's measurement in a space-like separated region has no instantaneous influence on that state. It's only if and when Alice tells Bob the result of her measurement that the state of Bob's particle changes at Bob's, but this communication cannot take place faster than the speed of light: spukhafte Fernwirkungen no more!
5
We mentioned the above in the interest of readers who may still be under the delusion that Alice's measurement has an instantaneous influence on the state of Bob's particle. However, we acknowledge that this issue is not central to a discussion of the EPR paper since they took the unambiguous (and correct) position that such influence would not take place. Their mistake was in taking the ontic position that all states are pure, from which it follows that the state of Bob's particle is defined independently of Alice's or Bob's knowledge about it.
Bohr's Response
In his response, Bohr [4] hardly addresses the issue of entanglement. For him, the phenomenon described in the EPR paper is nothing more than what he calls complementarity. He claims that in QM, as well as in general relativity, we must take into account the measuring device to make predictions on the object of interest. In essence, Bohr argues that position and momentum cannot both be measured with an arbitrary precision because we cannot do so experimentally, even in principle. A measure of the momentum of a particle can only be experimentally realized by a momentum transfer on the measurement apparatus, therefore creating a displacement and forsaking forever the knowledge of the position of the particle. In the EPR argument, says Bohr, when Alice measures the momentum of her particle, she learns that of Bob's, but at the same time renounces by her own free choice to the knowledge of position that she could have obtained on Bob's particle. This renunciation is based on the fact that we cannot predict the result of a measurement. In the example given above, if we want to measure the momentum of a particle, since there is no way to predict either the momentum exchange or the displacement caused by it, we cannot know with certainty where the particle interacted with the apparatus. The following quote summarizes Bohr's argument.
In fact, the renunciation in each experimental arrangement of the one or the other of two aspects of the description of physical phenomena,-the combination of which characterizes the method of classical physics, and which therefore in this sense may be considered as complementary to one another,-depends essentially on the impossibility, in the field of quantum theory, of accurately controlling the reaction of the object on the measuring instruments, i.e., the transfer of momentum in case of position measurements, and the displacement in case of momentum measurements.
The problem, of course, is that EPR had no issue with complementarity! They did not claim in their paper that it would be possible to know simultaneously the position and momentum of a particle with arbitrary precision. Indeed, had they not agreed with this manifestation of Heisenberg's uncertainty relations, they would surely have claimed that QM is outright incorrect, not merely incomplete! Their disagreement with the view of QM is summarized in the following quote from their paper:
The usual conclusion from this 6 in quantum mechanics is that when the momentum of a particle is known, its coordinate has no physical reality.
So, we see that, in the views of EPR, the incompleteness of QM has to do with the fact that it does not allow simultaneous reality for two noncommuting observables. Whether or not these two realities could be learned simultaneously is irrelevant to their argument. The fact that QM allows us to predict either the momentum or the position of a particle without having interacted with it, mutually exclusive as these measurements might be, seems to mean, according to Definition 2, that both of these quantities have physical reality. Therefore QM appears to be incomplete, according to their criterion of Definition 1.
Conclusion
We exhibited problems with the EPR argument, when seen through the eyes of mathematical logic, without any reference to Bell's inequality. We also questioned the narrow-minded view of "states" taken in that paper, although that view is not surprising from advocates of "elements of reality". Speaking of which, we should like to add to the criticisms laboured in our paper that the notion of "elements of reality" is left rather vague in the EPR paper. Nevertheless, we came down even harder on Bohr's response which, in our opinion, had entirely failed to address the main issue raised by EPR.
In retrospect, our criticism of the EPR paper notwithstanding, we admit without shame that we would have been more likely to side with them than with Bohr. . . until the bolt gave way to thunder under Bell's pen!
